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Abstract 
This paper presents a new partial-equilibrium, multi-market international model 
developed to analyze policies affecting peanut products markets. The model covers four 
goods (food-quality peanuts, crush-quality peanuts, peanut oil, and groundnut cake) in 13 
countries/regions (Argentina, Canada, China, the EU-15, the Gambia, India, Malawi, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, the United States, and Rest of World). Welfare is 
evaluated by looking at consumers’ equivalent variation, quasi-profits in farming (peanut 
farming, livestock), quasi-profits in crushing, and taxpayers’ revenues and outlays implied 
by distortions. We calibrate the model for three recent years (1999/2000, 2000/01, and 
2001/02) on historical data. We illustrate the model’s applicability with a peanut trade 
liberalization scenario. The impact of the reform scenario is measured in deviation from the 
historical baseline and by averaging the three estimates of annual impacts.  
 
Keywords: agricultural trade policy analysis, crush, Doha, groundnut, model, oil, 
peanuts. 
  
 
 
 
MODELING WORLD PEANUT PRODUCT MARKETS: 
A TOOL FOR AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
This paper presents a model developed for formal analysis of international peanut 
(groundnut) product markets.1 This paper is part of a research program on agricultural 
trade policy analysis undertaken by the World Bank for a series of agricultural 
commodity case studies covering cotton, dairy, grains, peanuts, rice, and sugar in the 
context of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. The 
peanut model presented here is used for analysis of multilateral agricultural and trade 
policy reform scenarios.  
The model has important features that set new standards in peanut market modeling in 
the context of severe data limitations on the production, utilization, and trade of value-
added peanut products. Most previous investigations of peanut/groundnut policy have 
assumed exogenous world prices and have focused on unilateral reforms (Hathie and Lopez 
2002; Kherallah and Govindan 1999; Rucker and Thurman 1990; among others). Our 
model provides an explicit determination of world peanut product prices via world market 
clearing. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations and its focus on development make our 
modeling effort particularly relevant given the importance of peanuts in many developing 
economies, including several African economies. Many analyses of peanut policy reforms 
have reached pessimistic conclusions, which may be reassessed in the context of the 
expectation that multilateral trade liberalization leads to much higher world prices.  
Another important feature is the product disaggregation. The model distinguishes 
crush- and food-quality peanuts in each country. Crush-quality peanut product is 
essentially a nontraded commodity, selling at a discount in most countries, and it is 
treated as such in the model. The model includes an endogenous quality premium for 
food-quality peanuts, which are traded internationally. So are peanut oil and cake since 
significant trade flows are observed. World prices transmit to domestic markets via price 
2 / Beghin and Matthey 
 
transmission equations incorporating the exchange rate, transportation margins, policy 
instruments, and an implicit discount for quality and transaction costs.  
Consumer choices are approached in a consistent fashion and reflect consumption 
decisions on oil and food peanuts, leading to an exact consumer welfare measure. The 
policy coverage is extensive and includes tariffs and taxes for most countries and the 
2002 U.S. peanut program. Finally, the country coverage is unique and includes a large 
set of developing economies, including five African countries for which peanuts are an 
important crop and source of rural income. 
The model starts with the agricultural sector producing crush-quality and food-
quality groundnuts and explains crushing and eventually the final consumption of food 
groundnuts and peanut oil. Agriculture provides groundnuts, which are used as seeds, 
crushed for oil and byproducts, made into cake for livestock feed, and used as food (such 
as groundnuts and peanut butter), which is aggregated into a single food use category. 
Policy instruments are present in all three markets (peanuts, oil, and cake), and these 
interact to distort agents’ decisions in these markets and hence distort trade flows and 
world market prices.  
In the following section, we present the model structure. Next, we explain how the 
model is calibrated and give the implied elasticity values for each country. We also 
explain the policy coverage in the model and how policy instruments are parameterized. 
Finally, we illustrate the model’s applicability with a simple but telling trade policy 
reform scenario. 
 
The Groundnut Model 
Since groundnut quality varies widely within and across countries, we model two 
qualities of groundnuts (food quality and crush quality) and their respective prices in each 
country. Food-quality groundnuts are traded internationally, and the world price for these 
groundnuts is determined by the world market equilibrium. In each country, the domestic 
price of food groundnuts is linked to the world price via a price-transmission equation 
reflecting the exchange rate, policy distortions, and the implicit presence of transaction 
costs from the border to the domestic market and farmgate. The imperfect transmission of 
world price effects to domestic markets for food-quality peanuts is consistent with the 
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quality differential across countries, since the world price (the so-called Rotterdam Price) 
is a price for the best available quality worldwide. 
In each country, the crush-quality groundnut market is treated as a nontraded good 
market, which it is in most countries. Domestic supply satisfies the crush-groundnut 
demand. In each country, food-quality groundnuts receive a quality premium relative to 
crush-quality groundnuts. This premium is endogenous and driven by cost to reflect the 
relative marginal cost of food-quality peanuts. As more food peanuts are produced 
relative to crush peanuts (as in a movement along a food-crush peanut transformation 
frontier), the premium for food peanuts increases to reflect the higher relative marginal 
cost of food-quality peanuts. 
Given serious data constraints on land allocation decisions and yields for the two 
qualities of groundnuts, land allocation is modeled as an aggregate, which responds 
positively to an average groundnut producer price. The average producer price reflects 
the prices received for the two groundnut qualities at marketing time, weighed by their 
respective shares in total groundnut production in the country. The weights are 
endogenous. This approach mimics two separate production decisions for which 
individual data are not available and which are “revealed” at harvest time. It is clear that 
if the price of food-quality peanuts rises relative to the price of crush-quality peanuts, 
then farmers will exert more effort to increase the average quality of their crop, resulting 
in a larger share of food-quality peanuts in their aggregate peanut crop. 
In each country, crushing is driven by crush margins (the net value of oil and cake 
produced in fixed proportions per unit of crushed groundnut). The demand for oil comes 
from consumers (domestic and/or foreign). The demand for cake comes from feed 
demand of the livestock sector (domestic and/or foreign). Excess demand/supply for 
these two commodities links the domestic and world markets. At equilibrium, the world 
oil and cake markets clear to determine the world price of these two traded commodities. 
In each country, a representative consumer derives utility from consuming an 
aggregate food-peanut product and peanut oil. Welfare is evaluated by looking at the 
consumer’s equivalent variation, quasi-profits in farming (peanut farming, livestock), 
quasi-profit in crushing, and taxpayer revenues and outlays implied by distortions.  
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Country coverage includes Argentina, Canada, China, the EU-15, the Gambia, India, 
Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, the United States, and an aggregate 
Rest of World. Commodity coverage includes four commodities: food-quality 
groundnuts, crush-quality groundnuts, groundnut oil, and groundnut cake. The policy 
coverage reflects the current (2002) level of trade and domestic policies presented in the 
policy section of the paper. The policy coverage allows an ambitious research program to 
analyze the separate impact of border measures on groundnuts, oil, and cake in all 
countries, their combined effects, and domestic policy such as the new U.S. peanut 
policy. We calibrate the model for three years (1999/2000, 2000/01, and 2001/02) on 
historical data using Microsoft Excel. Then, the impact of policy scenarios is measured in 
deviation from the historical baseline expressed in 1995 constant U.S. dollars. 
 
Agricultural Markets (Groundnuts) 
Groundnut Supply 
For the sake of exposition, we abstract from a country subscript when we present the 
structure of the country models. When required, we make it clear when aggregation over 
countries is necessary. In each producing country, the aggregate supply of peanuts, PS, is 
a function of the current domestic price, Ppavrg, which is the average of domestic farmgate 
prices for food-peanut production, FPS, and crush-peanut production, CPS, or 
Ppavrg=(CPS/PS)Pcp+(1-(CPS/PS))Pfp. A linear specification is chosen for the supply:  
 PS = bpo + bp1 Ppavw = bpo + bp1[(CPS/PS)Pcp + (FPS/PS)Pfp]. (1) 
Share coefficients (CPS/PS) and (1 – (CPS/PS)) are endogenous and reflect the 
composition of aggregate output. Estimates of parameters b come from the econometric 
or consensus estimates of supply elasticities depending on availability. This convoluted 
approach to modeling the aggregate supply decision is motivated by the lack of data on 
individual land allocation and yield for the two types of peanuts in most countries. 
Aggregate data are available for land, yield, and supply-price responses; separate data is 
available for crush-quality peanut and food-quality peanut outputs.  
We explain next how domestic price Pfp is determined. The farmgate price of food 
peanuts is a function of the world price of food peanuts expressed in local currency, Ppw, 
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domestic markets. We include transaction costs affecting the farmgate price from the 
border, tcp, and domestic policy td that may affect the price received by farmers. The 
domestic producer price for food peanuts is Pfp 	 pw 	 p – tcp) + td		 			en full 
transmission is assumed. We use values between 0.3 and 1 for this scalar parameter.  
The crush-quality groundnut price is determined by the domestic equilibrium for 
crush-quality peanuts, since the latter are treated as a nontraded goods market. Domestic 
supply satisfies the crush-quality groundnut demand. Relative to crush-quality, food-quality 
groundnuts receive a quality premium. This price premium is endogenous and driven by 
cost to reflect the relative marginal cost of food-quality peanuts. The typical premium is 
such that Pcp is between 40 and 50 percent of Pfp. As more food peanuts are produced 
relative to crush peanuts (as in a movement along a food-crush peanut transformation 
frontier), the premium for food peanuts increases to reflect the higher relative marginal cost 
of food-quality peanuts. We calibrate the two prices as follows: Pcp = Pfp (0.42 + 0.05 
CPS/PS)), which reflects the stylized facts of the two prices’ relationship. 
Price Ppw is determined by the equilibrium of the world market for food peanuts. 
Price Pcp is determined by the domestic market equilibrium for crush peanuts 
(demand=supply), as it is considered a nontraded good. The demand for crush peanuts is 
explained in what follows.  
The change in welfare of peanut producers is measured by the change in realized 
quasi-profit, from the initial situation reflecting the current distorted prices to a set of new 
prices. This welfare measure is  
 
1
pavrg
0
pavrg
p
p pavrg pavrgp
= PS(P )dP  ∆ ∫   (2) 
where superscripts 0 and 1 indicate old and new situations.  
Groundnut Demand 
The total demand for crush-quality peanuts, TPDc, is a sum of demands coming from 
seed use, PDseed, and crushing industry use, PDcrush: 
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 TPDc = PDseed + PDcrush. (3) 
Seed demand. The seed-derived demand, PDseed, is assumed to be driven by the price 
of peanuts and the expected production requirement for the year, which for simplicity is 
assumed to be equal to the actual output for the year. Hence, we assume instantaneous 
adjustment of seed demand to concurrent production changes. We also assume that the 
seed demand reflects an economic decision under an agronomic constraint, and we 
assume that other inputs prices are constant in peanut production: 
 PDseed 	 s0 	 s1		 s2Pcp,  (4) 
	 s0 denoting the intercept summarizing the effects of other input prices in the cost of 
	

	 s1	
			 			
	
		 s1 denoting 
the price response of seed demand.  
Crush demand. The crush demand, PDcrush, is driven by peanut oil demand and/or by 
cake demand. Given the joint product of oil and cake and the positive economic value 
attached to cake, the derived demand from crushing reflects both peanut oil and its by-
product cake. Groundnut cake is a valuable source of protein feed, especially in developing 
economies. The derived demand for crush peanuts is driven by the crush margin, bcrush:  
 PDcrush = PDcrush(bcrush ) with bcrush 	 oil Po 	 cake Pcake – Pcp. (5) 
	 oil 	 cake reflect the jointness of cake and oil in crushing (the oil and 
cake produced per unit of crushed peanut).  
Crush-peanut domestic market equilibrium. The supply and demand for crush 
peanuts are set equal (TPDcrush = CPS). 
Food-groundnut demand. Food-quality groundnut demand, PDfood, represents a 
single aggregate food use representing several food items in peanut equivalent (such as 
prepared peanuts, peanut butter, and candies). The final demand for food peanuts is part 
of an incomplete final demand system for food peanuts and peanut oil, and an aggregate 
all other goods, based on the Linquad demand system (Lafrance 1998).2 The system 
explains final consumption decisions for the two peanut goods as determined by 
corresponding prices described in a vector Ppg, Ppg = (Ppp, Po), and income, M. The 
demand is  
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 PDfood = PDfood(Ppp, Po, Pog, M).  (6) 
Price Pog describes the price of an aggregate all other goods. The parameterization of 
PDfood with the Linquad demand system is explained in the section dedicated to the final 
consumer. The consumer price Ppp is the world price of food peanuts inclusive of 
distortions dpp affecting consumers and a price wedge dictated by transaction cost tcp. A 
net importer status would imply an additional transportation margin atp and Ppp = Ppw + dpp 
+ tcp + atp in the latter case. 
Food-peanut domestic market equilibrium. The equilibrium equation is given as 
 DPf – PSf = PFPnetrade. (7) 
Net trade could be either imports or exports. At the world level, the sum over all 
countries of net trade flows is equal to zero. 
Food-peanut world market equilibrium. The sum of excess demands over all 
countries is equal to zero (!all i PFPnetradei = 0) and determines the world price for food-
quality peanuts.  
 
The Crushing Industry 
Oil and Meal Production 
This section describes the modeling of the peanut oil and cake3 supplies. We make the 
usual assumption of fixed proportion in the jointness of cake and oil production and price-
taking assumptions in oilseed crushing to describe the crushing cost. As the margin 
increases, the demand for crush peanuts increases. Market equilibrium between the 
horizontal supply of oil and cake and their respective market demands are such that 
equation (8) is satisfied. If the marginal cost were higher (lower) than the marginal price, a 
decrease (increase) in quantity of peanuts crushed would induce a joint movement along 
the demands for oil and cake to match the new production levels of oil and cake and an 
increase (decrease) in the industry price of oil and cake, re-establishing equilibrium. 
"	
		#			$		%$		#		 oilPDcrush, and       
%$		 cake PDcrush. The welfare of the crusher is just the quasi-profit from crushing.  
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The change in welfare between two policy regimes is just the difference in profits 
between the two states of the world: 
 crush = PD1crush(b1crush ) – PD0crush(b0crush ),  (8) 
where margin bicrush is evaluated at prices prevailing in period i. 
Peanut Oil and Cake Demand 
Peanut oil demand is a final demand coming from the consumer. Peanut oil is one of 
two peanut goods the final consumer purchases, as earlier explained in the section on 
food-peanut demand. The oil demand structure is similar to that for prepared-peanut 
demand: 
 POD = POD(Ppp, Po, Pog, M).  (9) 
The calibration of POD is explained in the section on the final consumer. 
Cake demand is a derived demand from livestock production. Cake or meal demand 
is an output-constant demand, which is a function of livestock numbers (aggregate 
livestock animal units, LAU), the price of cake, and the price of other feed products, Pfeed. 
We assume that the animal unit numbers and prices of competing feed products are 
unaffected by the policy reform and we abstract away from them in the policy scenario. 
The cake demand is 
 CakeD = CakeD(Pcake, Pfeed, LAU). (10) 
Oil and Cake Domestic Market Equilibria 
We assume trade in peanut oil and cake is an excess demand/supply and provides 
closure in these markets:  
 POD – POS = POnetrade, (11) 
and 
 CakeD – CakeS = Cakenetrade, (12) 
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with POnetrade and Cakenetrade representing the country import from or export to the 
world market for the two products. 
We link the world price in domestic currency and the domestic price for these two 
products via a price transmission equation similar to that for the food-peanut price with 
scalars cake		 oil. The equations are 
 Pcake 	 cake (Pcakew 	 cake – tccake ) + tpc,  (13) 
and 
 Po 	 oil (Pow		 o – tco) + tpo,  (14) 
		 							
		

	
	
costs, and domestic policy distortion in these two markets. 
Oil and Cake World Market Equilibria 
For each product, the sum of excess demand over all countries is equal to zero and 
determines the world price for the product (!all i POnetradei = 0; !all i Cakenetradei = 0). 
 
Treatment and Calibration of Final Consumption 
We follow the demand calibration approach described in Beghin, Bureau, and 
Drogué 2003. We have a representative consumer with expenditure function e(P, U), 
with P being the vector of relevant consumer prices, and with U denoting utility. We are 
interested in a vector of two peanut-containing goods, PGD = (PPD, POD), that is, 
prepared peanuts and peanut oil, with prices Ppg, Ppg = (Ppp, Po). For completeness, we 
have an aggregate other goods, OG, with price Pog. The approach allows us to derive an 
exact welfare measure from an incomplete demand system. The price vector P is 
decomposed into P = (Ppg, Pog), and income is denoted by M, with subscripts indicating 
the respective commodities. The Linquad expression of the vector of Marshallian 
demands for agricultural and food goods is 
 
1
2( ( ))M ogM p= + + − − − δpg pg pg pgPGD      (15) 
corresponding to the expenditure function 
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 ( , , ) ( ) ( , ) exp( ).og og oge p u p p uδ θ= − − +1pg pg pg pg pg2p      (16) 
The elements of vectors  and  in equations (15) and (16), together with the elements of 
matrix V, are calibrated using the following procedure. The calibration imposes 
homogeneity of degree one in prices for e(.) by normalizing Ppg by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). Calibration imposes symmetry of the Hessian of e(.) by imposing symmetry 
of V. Concavity is also imposed by calibration of parameter  og) in (15). Parameters 
 and V are identified by solving the system of equations: 
21 1 1
2 2 2
- 1( - ) ( - ) - - ( - ) -
- -
(1- ) - - ,
M
ji i i
i i i ii j j ij i j jk j k
j i j i j i k ii i i i
M
i
ij i j i jk k
allkj
M
i
ii i i i i i ij j
i ji
M
pPGD M p
p p v p v p p v p p
PGD
v v P
p
PGD
v p v p
p
χ
ε ε
χ χ χ χ
χ ε χ
χ χ ε χ
≠ ≠ ≠ ≠
≠
∂
= ∂     
= +           ∂
= ∂∂ =∂
∑ ∑ ∑∑
∑
∑
PGD
 (17) 
where the derivatives &'()&j are estimated thanks to prior information on local 
				
	
				
				 			
to zero if curvature conditions are satisfied (see Beghin, Bureau, and Drogué 2003 for 
details), or M –	 		*	"	
		 	+			
	, i.e., the 
slope of income response of consumption of peanut goods, are calibrated using estimates 
of the income demand elasticities. Then, the estimated  is used in the next three 
equations in (17), which are then linear in unknown parameters  and V	,	 ik are 
set equal to zero for cross-price responses &'(i/&k for which no prior information is 
known. This procedure allows accommodation of various stages of knowledge on cross-
price effects in an integrable system of demands. Each additional known cross-price 

	

	
			 
	
			 ik. The system of equations (17) is 
exactly identified if curvature is met. Calibration makes it possible to express the 
functional form of the Marshallian demand system (15), and to retrieve the right-hand 
side of the derivatives shown. The expression 
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1
2( ’ ) ’
H
M∂ = + − −
∂ pg pg pgpg
PGD V   
P
 
for the Linquad Hicksian price response is derived from the Slutsky identity, with the 
calibrated values of the elements of V and .  
 
Welfare Analysis 
Equations (15) and (16) lead to an equivalent variation, EV, equal to  
 EV = [M – ’P1pg   – 0.5 P1pg’V P1pg] exp[( 0pg – 1pg ] (18) 
  – [M – pg’P0pg   – 0.5 P0pg’V P0pg ].  
We compute the change in expenditure, which would keep utility at the free-trade utility 
level under the distorted program prices. Superscripts 0 and 1 denote initial distorted and 
final free-trade prices.  
Taxpayers 
With policy reforms, there is a potential change in tax revenues associated with the 
trade of food peanuts, oil, and cake. These changes are captured by the accounting 
identity (new flow × new tax rates × new prices – old flows × old tax rates × old prices).  
Net Welfare Gains from Policy Reform 
Net welfare is defined as the EV of the consumer net of losses/gains to peanut 
producers, changes in livestock producers’ surplus, changes in profits in crushing, and 
gains (losses) for taxpayers. 
 
Calibration 
Production, Utilization, and Trade Data 
We use the Production, Supply, and Distribution (PS&D) data of the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA-FAS 2003a) to calibrate production, 
utilization, and trade of peanuts and products for three years (1999/2000–2001/02). The 
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latter dataset is completed by Food and Agriculture Organization data whenever USDA-
FAS PS&D is not available.  
The macro data consist of gross domestic product (GDP) (as a proxy for income), a 
GDP deflator (a proxy for the CPI), and the exchange rate. They come from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IMF 2001) and the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2003). The baseline 
and simulations were run for the three years and averaged.  
Policy Instruments 
Table 1 presents the parameterized policy instruments by country. The description of 
these policies is presented in detail in Diop, Beghin, and Sewadeh 2003. The coverage of 
border measures is extensive. The coverage of domestic distortions (farm support, other 
taxes/subsidies) is spotty despite a long search through World Bank sources and Attaché 
Reports of the USDA-FAS (2003b). Domestic distortions in OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) countries are documented but are harder to 
collect for developing economies. We cover the major features of the new U.S. farm 
legislation on peanuts (loan rate and countercyclical payments based on target price). 
Trade protection in the United States is not effective since preferential imports of peanuts 
could enter at zero tariffs and the current tariff rate quota (TRQ) is underfilled. Hence, 
the high tariffs for out-of-quota peanut imports do not apply in this case.  
Domestic price wedges such as value-added taxes are available for a few countries 
(e.g., China) but are not covered systematically. India and China have the highest 
protection levels, including a strong protection of value-added activities. Given the strong 
governmental presence in peanut markets in these two countries, it is hard to know 
exactly what protection levels are provided to farmers. Some African countries have 
some border protection on oil and prepared-peanut products to protect their domestic 
value-added activities. 
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Supply and Demand Elasticities 
Table 2 shows the various elasticities used in the model. Most of the elasticities 
come from the elasticity database of the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Intitute 
(FAPRI) models and are a combination of econometric and consensus estimates. Both 
demand and supply are price inelastic. Income elasticities are positive but smaller than 
one. These values are consistent with common wisdom on the price responsiveness of 
agricultural markets.  
 
Illustrative Policy Reform Scenario 
We illustrate the model capability with a simple but telling scenario.4 We consider 
multilateral peanut trade liberalization for peanuts, holding meal and oil tariffs at their 
baseline values. Many debates of the Doha Round of the WTO evolve around narrow 
agricultural negotiations. Hence, it is useful to assess what a narrow agricultural 
liberalization would achieve relative to a full trade liberalization encompassing value-added 
products (oil and cake). We call this scenario PMTL (peanut multilateral trade 
liberalization). We report results in Tables 3 and 4. All results from changes in price and 
physical flows are reported in percentage changes from the baseline. Changes in welfare 
are reported in 1995 purchasing power parity (PPP) in U.S. dollars. The baseline and 
simulations were run for three years (1999–2001) and averaged. Much is achieved by 
peanut trade liberalization alone but with a large second-best component since distortions 
are present in the value-added markets. In this peanut liberalization scenario, the price of 
peanuts goes up by 18 percent. However, world prices for cake and oil are little affected, 
increasing by 0.5 percent and 2 percent respectively. Crush margins are primarily affected 
by changes in peanut prices. Margins improve in India and China but deteriorate in 
countries with no or small oil and cake distortions. Consumer welfare implications are as 
follows. In highly protected peanut markets, food-peanut prices are lower with the PMTL 
scenario and consumers benefit. In countries with no peanut distortions, peanut prices 
increase and hurt consumers. Oil prices increase by a small amount, and the welfare effects 
of the latter are negative but moderate. African economies benefit marginally from this 
scenario because they still are handicapped by the protection of value-added markets 
prevailing in several large countries, namely China and India. The potential welfare gains for 
the Africa-5 total about $56 million.5 
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TABLE 2. Elasticities used in the model 
Country Commodity Activity Elasticity Value 
Argentina Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.3 
Argentina Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.2 
Argentina Peanuts Food demand Income 0.4 
Argentina Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.2 
Argentina Peanuts Seed demand Own-price -0.3 
Argentina Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.8 
Argentina Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.9 
Argentina Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.3 
Argentina Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price -0.6 
Argentina Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.5 
Argentina Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.4 
Argentina Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price 0.5 
EU-15 Peanuts Supply Own-price na 
EU-15 Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.36 
EU-15 Peanuts Food demand Income 0.3 
EU-15 Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.15 
EU-15 Peanuts Seed demand Own-price na 
EU-15 Peanuts Seed demand Output na 
EU-15 Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.95 
EU-15 Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.41 
EU-15 Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price -0.9 
EU-15 Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.375 
EU-15 Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.2 
EU-15 Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price -0.9 
China Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.38 
China Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.15 
China Peanuts Food demand Income 0.3 
China Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.13 
China Peanuts Seed demand Own-price -0.1 
China Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.85 
China Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price na 
China Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.35 
China Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price na 
China Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.25 
China Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.175 
China Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price na 
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TABLE 2. Continued 
Country Commodity Activity Elasticity Value 
India Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.35 
India Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.38 
India Peanuts Food demand Income 0.9 
India Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.26 
India Peanuts Seed demand Own-price 0.2 
India Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.9 
India Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price na 
India Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.35 
India Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price na 
India Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.35 
India Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.3 
India Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price na 
Rest of World Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.35 
Rest of World Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.25 
Rest of World Peanuts Food demand Income 0.2 
Rest of World Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.15 
Rest of World Peanuts Seed demand Own-price -0.35 
Rest of World Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.7 
Rest of World Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.12 
Rest of World Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.4 
Rest of World Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price -0.75 
Rest of World Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.375 
Rest of World Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.9 
Rest of World Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price -0.775 
Canada Peanuts Supply Own-price na 
Canada Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.4 
Canada Peanuts Food demand Income 0.4 
Canada Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
na 
Canada Peanuts Seed demand Own-price na 
Canada Peanuts Seed demand Output na 
Canada Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.83 
Canada Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price na 
Canada Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price na 
Canada Peanut oil Final demand Own-price na 
Canada Peanut oil Final demand Income na 
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TABLE 2. Continued 
Country Commodity Activity Elasticity Value 
Canada Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price na 
Mexico Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.23 
Mexico Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.3 
Mexico Peanuts Food demand Income 0.4 
Mexico Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
na 
Mexico Peanuts Seed demand Own-price na 
Mexico Peanuts Seed demand Output na 
Mexico Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price na 
Mexico Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price na 
Mexico Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price na 
Mexico Peanut oil Final demand Own-price na 
Mexico Peanut oil Final demand Income na 
Mexico Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price na 
Senegal Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.35 
Senegal Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.2 
Senegal Peanuts Food demand Income 0.6 
Senegal Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.35 
Senegal Peanuts Seed demand Own-price -0.2 
Senegal Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.9 
Senegal Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.55 
Senegal Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.35 
Senegal Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price -0.85 
Senegal Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.5 
Senegal Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.3 
Senegal Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price na 
Nigeria Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.35 
Nigeria Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.2 
Nigeria Peanuts Food demand Income 0.3 
Nigeria Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.2 
Nigeria Peanuts Seed demand Own-price -0.2 
Nigeria Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.9 
Nigeria Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.85 
Nigeria Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.35 
Nigeria Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price na 
Nigeria Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.38 
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TABLE 2. Continued 
Country Commodity Activity Elasticity Value 
Nigeria Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.6 
Nigeria Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price na 
South Africa Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.35 
South Africa Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.2 
South Africa Peanuts Food demand Income 0.6 
South Africa Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.2 
South Africa Peanuts Seed demand Own-price -0.2 
South Africa Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.9 
South Africa Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.85 
South Africa Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.35 
South Africa Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price na 
South Africa Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.38 
South Africa Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.3 
South Africa Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price na 
Malawi Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.35 
Malawi Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.2 
Malawi Peanuts Food demand Income 0.6 
Malawi Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.2 
Malawi Peanuts Seed demand Own-price -0.2 
Malawi Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.9 
Malawi Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.85 
Malawi Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.35 
Malawi Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price -0.85 
Malawi Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.38 
Malawi Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.3 
Malawi Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price na 
Gambia Peanuts Supply Own-price 0.35 
Gambia Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.2 
Gambia Peanuts Food demand Income 0.6 
Gambia Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.2 
Gambia Peanuts Seed demand Own-price -0.2 
Gambia Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.9 
Gambia Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.85 
Gambia Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.35 
Gambia Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price -0.85 
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TABLE 2. Continued 
Country Commodity Activity Elasticity Value 
Gambia Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.38 
Gambia Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.3 
Gambia Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price -0.375 
U.S. Peanuts Supply Own-net 
return 
0.35 
U.S. Peanuts Food demand Own-price -0.2 
U.S. Peanuts Food demand Income 0.3 
U.S. Peanuts Crush demand Crush-margin 
elasticity 
0.25 
U.S. Peanuts Seed demand Own-price -0.2 
U.S. Peanuts Seed demand Output 0.9 
U.S. Peanuts Inventory demand Own-price -0.55 
U.S. Peanut meal Feed-derived demand Own-price -0.35 
U.S. Peanut meal Inventory demand Own-price -0.85 
U.S. Peanut oil Final demand Own-price -0.25 
U.S. Peanut oil Final demand Income 0.15 
U.S. Peanut oil Inventory demand Own-price -0.85 
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TABLE 4. Welfare effects of the PMTL policy scenario (in million $ at 1995 prices) 
Country PMTL 
  (Average 1999-2001) 
Argentina 21 
EU-15 -75 
China 349 
India 167 
Rest of world 107 
Canada -10 
Mexico -13 
Senegal 26 
Nigeria 19 
South Africa 3 
Malawi 7 
Gambia 1 
U.S. 48 
Africa-5 totala 56 
Total 651 
a Denotes the aggregate of Senegal, Nigeria, South Africa, Malai, and the Gambia. 
 
For the large protectionist countries (e.g., China and India), the net effect of the 
peanut price increase and removal of protection is beneficial to final users of peanuts, 
other things being equal. Peanut imports expand in these countries. For countries with 
moderate or no protection before the reforms, the net impact (tariff removal and terms of 
trade) is an increase in domestic prices of peanuts, handicapping peanut users (final 
consumers and crushers). These substantial terms-of-trade effects have a large impact on 
trade and complicate the welfare impact of the reforms since allocative efficiency gains 
can be offset by large price increases originating in post-reform world markets. 
Crush margins deteriorate in the European Union, India, Malawi, Senegal, and the 
United States. However, margins improve in China, the Gambia, Nigeria, and South 
Africa. Countries facing deteriorating margins but that have a competitive peanut 
production expand their production and exports of peanuts (e.g., Senegal and the United 
States) but reduce their exports of processed products.  
Trade patterns change dramatically. Table 4 shows the welfare impact of the 
reforms by country. China and India experience trade reversal, becoming large 
importers of peanuts. The aggregate net welfare effects amount to about $650 million at 
1995 prices. Not surprisingly, China and India experience the largest welfare gains, 
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because they have the two most distorted peanut product markets. The “moderate” 
world welfare effect first comes from offsets (some countries gain in aggregate whereas 
others, chiefly the EU-15, lose).  
 
Conclusions 
This paper presented a new international peanut product model with important and 
novel features that set new standards in peanut market modeling in the context of severe 
data limitations on the production, utilization, and trade of value-added peanut products. 
The model provides an explicit world price determination via world market clearing. The 
model distinguishes crush- and food-quality peanuts by treating crush peanuts as a 
nontraded commodity and by incorporating an endogenous quality premium for food-
quality peanuts in each country. Food-quality peanuts are traded internationally.  
World prices transmit to domestic market via a price transmission equation 
incorporating the exchange rate, transportation margins, policy instruments, and an 
implicit discount for quality and transaction costs. In addition, consumer choices are 
approached in a consistent fashion and reflect consumption decisions on oil and food 
peanuts, leading to an exact consumer welfare measure.  
The policy coverage is also extensive, including tariffs and taxes for most countries 
and the new (2002) U.S. peanut program. Finally, the country coverage is unique and 
includes five African countries. 
We illustrate the model’s capability with a peanut trade liberalization scenario, 
which shows the intricate linkages between the four markets and the welfare effects for 
individual countries. 
  
Endnotes 
1. We use the terms peanut and groundnut interchangeably.  
2. Some other oils could be easily added to the demand system, if ever an expanded 
investigation covered other oils (e.g., soy, sunflower, and rapeseed oils).  
3. We use the terms cake and meal interchangeably. 
4. An extensive analysis of further policy reforms is provided in Diop, Beghin, and 
Sewadeh 2003. 
5. Africa-5 denotes our aggregate of the Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, and South 
Africa. 
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